Remediation contribution orders: section 124 of the Building Safety Act 2022

Building Safety Act 2022 s.124 · Remediation contribution orders · First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) · Associates (s.121)

What is a remediation contribution order?

A remediation contribution order (“RCO”) is an order of the First-tier Tribunal under section 124 of the Building Safety Act 2022. It requires a specified company or partnership to pay a specified person money “for the purpose of meeting costs incurred or to be incurred in remedying, or otherwise in connection with, relevant defects” in a relevant building (s.124(2)). The tribunal may make the order “if it considers it just and equitable to do so” (s.124(1)).

The jurisdiction is not based on fault. The Upper Tribunal has described it as “a new form of statutory liability”: Edgewater (Stevenage) Ltd v Grey GR Limited Partnership [2026] UKUT 18 (LC) at [158]. Every argument that has tried to read into s.124 a limit taken from the general law has so far failed.

Who can apply, and who can be ordered to pay?

Any “interested person” can apply: the Secretary of State, the Building Safety Regulator, the local authority, the fire and rescue authority, and anyone with a legal or equitable interest in the building, which includes leaseholders and freeholders (s.124(5)).

An order can be made against (s.124(3)):

• a current landlord of the building or any part of it;
• a person who was a landlord at the qualifying time (the start of 14 February 2022);
• the developer; or
• a person “associated” with any of them, as defined in s.121.

What are the leading cases?

There are three controlling authorities:

1. Triathlon Homes LLP v Stratford Village Development Partnership [2025] EWCA Civ 846, which settled the purposive framework and, subject to the Supreme Court, retrospectivity;
2. Edgewater (Stevenage) Ltd v Grey GR Limited Partnership [2026] UKUT 18 (LC), the decision of the Chamber President (Edwin Johnson J), which settled joint and several liability and the structure of the just and equitable question; and
3. URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2025] UKSC 21, which gives the Supreme Court’s account of the Act’s purpose: to remediate historic defects quickly, to protect leaseholders, and to hold those responsible to account (at [84]).

How does the tribunal approach an application?

Edgewater at [176] establishes two separate exercises.

1. The gateway conditions. The building must be a relevant building, the respondent must fall within s.124(3), and the costs must fall within s.124(2). The applicant must prove these ([177] to [178]).
2. The just and equitable question. Satisfying the gateway is not enough: “there has to be something more” ([179]). The applicant must state its case on why an order is just and equitable, but there is no general evidential burden on it ([181] to [182]).

The President deliberately declined to list the relevant factors. The discretion is “very wide” ([180]) and decisions are “very fact-sensitive” ([216]).

What does “just and equitable” mean in practice?

The cases establish six firm propositions.

1. No need for participation or profit. The respondent does not have to have taken part in the development or profited from it: Edgewater at [216] to [220]. In Triathlon itself the respondent had neither built the development nor taken its profits.
2. Association is relevant but not enough on its own. There is no presumption that an associate must pay: Edgewater at [199]. What justified the orders there were further “linking factors”: shared beneficial owners, blurred finances and unreliable records ([200] to [203]).
3. Respondents who say nothing do so at their peril. The tribunal may draw adverse inferences from unsatisfactory evidence: Edgewater at [224], [314]. In Hallings Wharf the associate pleaded that its position was different from the developer’s but called no evidence, and failed ([161] to [162]).
4. Public money sits outside the hierarchy. The Act creates “a hierarchy or cascade of liability” with the developer at the top, and the Building Safety Fund is a last resort: Triathlon at [61], [87] to [88]. That the works are already publicly funded is no answer.
5. Motive and the identity of the applicant are irrelevant: Triathlon at [78] to [81].
6. No need to exhaust other remedies. An applicant need not sue contractors first or wait for other litigation: Triathlon at [95] to [97].

Can an RCO be made jointly and severally against several respondents?

Yes. In Edgewater at [124] to [167] the President rejected the argument that the singular wording of s.124(2) prevents it. Separately apportioned orders would leave an applicant facing insolvent respondents “with something resembling a colander” ([136]).

But the power is not automatic. Joint and several liability “is not the starting point in every case”: the tribunal must consider, respondent by respondent, whether the right outcome is joint and several liability, apportionment, or no liability at all ([316]). I expect to see more argued apportionment cases now that the jurisdiction point is closed.

What costs can be recovered?

Since 31 October 2024, s.124(2A) gives a non-exhaustive list: the costs of taking relevant steps (including interim measures), expert reports, and temporary accommodation during a decant. The decided cases show:

• Works costs, including making good and items the works made necessary: Hallings Wharf at [99] to [113].
• Interim measures such as waking watch and temporary alarms: Empire Square; Hallings Wharf at [114] to [117].
• Expert reports, expressly within s.124(2A)(b).
• Temporary accommodation. In One The Brayford (FTT, 15 June 2026), a prohibition notice followed by residents leaving was a “decant”. The costs of the accommodation and outward-facing costs such as removal, storage and travel are recoverable. A council’s staff overtime and legal costs are not ([27] to [68]).
• VAT. In Hallings Wharf the VAT element (£624,557.83) was recoverable ([118] to [123]).

Can the legal costs of the proceedings be included?

This is an open question, and the first-instance decisions conflict.

• In Empire Square (FTT, 5 June 2025) the tribunal held that it could include legal costs, because “costs” in s.124(2) is unlimited and “in connection with” is very wide.
• In Hallings Wharf (FTT, 21 May 2026) a differently constituted tribunal doubted that, and refused a claim for over £1 million. It found it “striking” that Parliament listed examples in s.124(2A) and left out litigation costs, in a tribunal that does not usually award costs ([146]).

The Upper Tribunal will have to decide. I think it is likely to prefer Hallings Wharf on the general question, while perhaps keeping a narrow category where the proceedings were themselves needed to get an unremediated building fixed. Until then, applicants who want litigation costs should claim them from the start. The late amendment in Hallings Wharf was fatal on its own.

Does the tribunal reduce the order if the works could have been done more cheaply?

Not if the works were within the range of reasonable responses. In Hallings Wharf at [55] to [59], a £1.4 million cheaper alternative scheme did not reduce the order: the choice between reasonable options belongs to the party doing the works. In Edgewater the full cost of replacing a wall was upheld even though the experts agreed it was technically disproportionate, because the landlord acted reasonably on its consultant’s advice under time pressure ([258] to [310]). A respondent must show the scheme was unreasonable at the time, on the advice then available. Hindsight savings are not enough.

Can an RCO cover costs incurred before the Act came into force?

Yes, on the present law. The Court of Appeal held in Triathlon at [145] to [154] that s.124 permits an RCO in respect of costs incurred before 28 June 2022. That point is before the Supreme Court (UKSC/2025/0156), listed for 19 November 2026, the day after the Schedule 8 appeal in Adriatic Land 5. Permission was refused on the just and equitable grounds, so the rest of Triathlon stands whatever happens. I expect the Court of Appeal to be upheld. In the meantime, costs schedules should split spending before and after 28 June 2022.

What if the developer is insolvent?

The regime is built for insolvency. In Hallings Wharf the developer had been in liquidation since 2018, and an order for £3,682,997.78 was made against its associate, linked by common family ownership and control ([160] to [162], [177]). The primary target’s insolvency is a reason to pursue associates, and the applicant does not have to prove in the liquidation first.

What if there are High Court proceedings about the same building?

In Wallace Estates Ltd v Durkan Estates Ltd [2026] EWHC 2133 (TCC), Constable J, sitting with Judge Siobhan McGrath, ordered that an RCO application and a TCC claim about the same building be managed and tried together, with findings of fact binding in both. This is very likely to become the standard direction wherever the facts overlap.

Practice points

• Map the corporate group early from Companies House filings. Look for association under s.121 and, more importantly, the linking factors that Edgewater shows will decide the just and equitable question.
• Plead the just and equitable case properly. Gateway facts alone will not do.
• Plead every head of cost from the outset, including any claim to litigation costs, and split the schedule at 28 June 2022.
• For respondents: engage with the evidence. The best points now are apportionment under Edgewater [316] and range-of-reasonable-responses challenges supported by evidence from the time.

The key decisions

← The Building Safety Act 2022: commentary and case digest